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IV.—CAUSATION AND ITS ORGANIC CONDITION^.
HI.
SCIENTIFIC analysis teaches us that the externally compelled
portion of our mental presence consists immediately only of
seasonal elements specifically aroused. The objectifying and
further complemental amplification of these specific sensorial
signals result from an activity operating within our own self,
an activity by which their respective significations are dis-
criminated and recognised through the more or less complete
mental reinstatement of their usual bearings upon our indivi-
duality.
We may roughly picture this process in the likeness of the
widening vortex, formed by the outflow of a fluid through a
narrow opening of a vessel, involving ultimately in its commo-
tion the entire superincumbent mass of contents.1 The local
sensory disturbance or sensorial awakening is similarly followed
by a more or less extensive stirring up of the mental repose, by
a spreading actuation within the resting contents of potential
mind.
The special group of mental reinstatements, representing as
so-called ideas or images further sensorial potentialities directly
connected with actually experienced sensations, constitutes our
percepts. A percept is adjudged real and correct when its ideal
complement of feeling can be positively realised by placing our-
selves in proper situations actually to receive the suggested
feelings as veritable sensorial impressions.
Now it happens generally and very naturally that in percep-
tion the intrinsic process of reinstatement is lost sight OL Not
the specifically stimulating influence that arouses the actual
sensorial sign, nor the sensorial sign itself, but the whole per-
ceptual result externalised is taken as cause of its own re-
presentation within the mental presence. Thus the entire
perceptually objectified thing is hypostatised as the efficient
agent which is affecting our sensibility, which in fact is forcing
itself upon our attention.
1
 This figure applies with almost literal truth to the organic process
underlying perception. The functional tapping of the sensory inlets by
specific stimulation actually creates a centrally widening vortex of func-
tional commotion, involving more or less of the synthetical substance (see
Mnro No. XVIL). But the loss by outflow through functional disintegra-
tion is promptly made good by reintegration, and this is exactly the specific
prerogative of vitality.
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382 Causation and its Organic Conditions.
The constraining force of this illusion is to be found in the
circumstance that there actually subsists a connaturally pre-
established harmony or correspondence between the ideal feel-
ings forming part of a percept and the ^external energies or
causes thereby suggested. The direct external causes which
would give full actuality to the now merely ideally aroused
perceptual complement lie, in truth, ready to exert their stimu-
lating efficiences in combination with the special sensory
stimulus by which the percept has in fact been awakened. The
suggested feelings are by dint of pre-arrangement premonitory
of actual feelings.
Through this perceptual illusion, which projects internally
awakened feelings as actualities of external causes that in truth
are only potentially subsisting, everything that has its existence
between the hypostatically complemented object and its mental
representation remains more or less neglected. In accordance
with this attitude we believe that we are perceiving exactly,
or at least figuratively, what is outside of us. We are then
Eealists of various shades, according to the amount of modifying
power which we are willing to attribute to the organic medium
whereby the external thing effects its impression on the mind.
Practically we are all Eealists of the purest grain, overlooking
habitually the entire combination of realising contrivances, and
only attending to the thing or event that we are finally per-
ceiving, as if this were entirely a foreign existence outside of us.
If through philosophical reflection we have, on the contrary,
become Idealists, we cannot of course allow ourselves to
transcend the sphere of mind. Finding the perfected object
mentally given, we seek to account for it by constructing i t out
of mental elements, or by detaching it from an all-comprising
mental totality. We do not admit extramental causes or con-
trivances at alL
The thorough Eealist assumes nothing essentially qualifying
between the object and its mental mirror. The thorough
Idealist grants nothing b°yond variously clustered or syn-
thetised mental states, or beyond a complex mental constitution,
of which the object is thought to form a part or to inhere as
affection.
We, in conformity with the results of our previous research,
have—unlike the Idealist—to look for all causation of mental
states outside the mental presence, which to us means outside
mind altogether. Unlike the Eealist, we can admit as positively
known only effects within the mental presence, not their external
causes. These we only infer.
Our task will then simply be to find the proper attitude
towards the effect-compelling forces. For through the interpreta-
2 r- •
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tion of the effects we desire to become aware of the full range and
peculiar disposition of the causative agents. This is undeniably
what we always endeavour to do when we wish to explore what
we are compelled to take for extemaL We assume the recep-
tive mood, and place our sensory inlets in tentative relation with
the surmised foreign powers. We then judge of the nature of
these powers solely by the manner in which they are capable of
affecting us, i.e., of arousing mental states. Henceforth those
powers are for us nothing more nor less than their ascertained
range of specific influence upon our sensibilities.
Now it is clear that, just as the living individual naturally
behaves in order to gain an accurate knowledge of the causes
effecting his perceptions, so have we here designedly to behave
in order to gain a full knowledge of the complex causes effecting
the mental presence. We have to undertake the office of a
general and impartial reagent, opening our sensibilities just as
well to the impressions caused by the organic individual itself
as to the impressions caused by its environment. We have to
take in, under one and the same manifesting aspect, the entire
combination of conditions here co-operating. In this manner
the organic individual and its vital properties on the one side,
and the non-vital things and occurrences surrounding it on the
other side, can all be tested by one common standard. Their
differences and their agreements may in this way be faithfully
recorded in the sensitive medium which they are both affecting
under the same conditions. Disinterested reason, sitting in
judgment on the constitution and mutual relation of these uni-
formly viewed appearances, will perhaps, when thus impartially
informed, prove competent to arrive at some valuable conclusions
regarding their peculiar mode of interaction and their respective
participation in the production of the mental presence.
From this point of view, which is the point of view of true
science, it becomes first of all certain that the organism and ite
environment belong to one and the same order of nature. They
affect the sensitive and observing reagent in an essentially
similar manner. The differences perceived are evidently due,
not to an incommensurable disparity of being, but to a varied
disposition of their fundamental points of agreement. It is
furthermore readily recognised that external influences, which
evince themselves to the sensibility of the observer as actually
perceived or legitimately imagined motions of certain actually
perceived or legitimately imagined substrata, are capable of
affecting the living substance as stimuli By some inscrutable
efficiency their motions seem to awaken through impact motions
in the living substance. But the motions thus induced in the
living substance are found to differ totally from the motions
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displayed by the stimulating agents. The motions of the stimu-
lating agents are neither translated nor transfigured into the
motions of the vital substance; nor do the motor energies of
such agents combine in any way with energies inherent in the
living substance. Outside powers simply effect a chemical
rupture in the organic material, shattering its- constitution in a
specific way at the points of contact Thus far, and no farther,
does the direct influence of stimuli extend.
From this plain fact, biologically proved beyond suspicion,
much may be learned. Many an elaborate philosophical
scheme, dispossessed thereby of its fundamental assumption,
crumbles to pieces. We may rest assured that there is here no
passage open through which outside powers can in any manner
and shape make their entry into the living substance. What is
outeide remains outside for good, so far as stimulation and
irritability are concerned. There is here no blending of the
objective and subjective, no coalescence of external and internal
components, resulting in a subject-object presentation of influ-
ences. Whatever happens inside the organism, in consequence
of the stimulating clash, is due to nothing but the indwelling
endowments of the living substance itself. We can therefore
finally dispose of the doctrine, which assumes that outside and
inside influences combine like chemical agents, the things per-
ceived being the outcome of this mystic union. Most unmis-
takeably the external and the internal conditions do not here
coalesce, are not compounded into an effect, which represents
these conditions unified. The dynamical stimuli are to the
organism only excitants arousing its own specific energies. The
entire vital effect is an internal response, in which the stimulus
does in no way itself participate.
Accordingly, we have also to reject the very prevalent theory
that outside things are reproduced inside the organism in a
transfigured state. However accurate the correspondence of the
living order to the stimulating order, there can result therefrom
no such product as that assumed in " Transfigured Eealism "-1
The properties of external existences are not in the remotest
degree reproduced in the organic medium through stimulation.
They can in no way impress themselves in transfigured pro-
jection. There obtains no representative relation whatever
between the affecting influences and the aroused affections of
1
 Mr. Herbert Spencer, who uses the above misleading term, is himself
fully aware of the incommensurability of the stimulating powers and their
effects within mind. But it is an unfortunate name, and a still more
unfortunate illustration, by which he endeavours to make clear the actual
correspondence obtaining between the world outside the organism and its
seasonal revelation within the organism.
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the living substance. The stimuli in their direct effects are, on
the contrary, hostile, destructive. They disintegrate the func-
tioning material. It is only the slowly acquired power of
effective resistance which enables life to confront and adequately
to reflect, i.e., to ward off outside infringement. It is the perfect
play of subtly attuned vital reaction against most specific
dynamical encroachment which renders the internal commotion
consonant with the external motion. Whatever becomes in-
wardly revealed, as result of this awakening contest, is most
certainly vitality's own specific creation.
The sensitive surface presents a solid front to the impinging
powers not admitting their interpenetration. Its adequate re-
sistance is due to its high-wrought restitutive energies. Thus
in full-tuned accord its restitutive beats resist the disintegra-
ting dynamic beats, and it is in this synchronous activity, in
f.hia subtly responsive vital quivering, that lies the secret of
its sensitive impressibility; but not the secret of its sensorial
sensibility. The inward qualitative ring of the awakening
touches is altogether dependent on pre-established molecular
constitution.
The kinship of nature, so obviously obtaining between the
organism and outaide existences, does certainly not originate at
the sensitive surface. The external powers of nature are, on the
contrary, effectively repelled at the sensitive front. Where
kinship obtains, it has been established by connatural evolution.
Physical conditions and chemical elaboration have led, on the
one hand, up to various definite modes of being outside the
organism; on the other hand, up to the organic tissue in which
sensibility is inherent In proportion as the developmental
conditions of the outaide things have been like those of the
feeling organism itself will there be found kinship of nature
between them. And just in proportion as the outaide things
have contributed to the development of the organism will there
be found adaptation of the organism to their affecting influences.
The observer has both orders before him, the vital things and
the non-vital things. The vital things coming under the play
of energies emanating from the non-vital things are affected
thereby; specifically affected by the sundry specific energies
surrounding them. These direct and specific affections, to which
in the course of development the organism has become attuned,
have acquired for it the significance of definite signs, by which
its entire range of relationship to the signalised external exist-
ences is more or less vividly awakened. But, and this is a very
essential point, the relational feelings roused by the specific
sign may have their seat and fulfilment not at all at the sensi-
tive surface, or anywhere within the region of perceptual re-
25
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alisation, but somewhere entirely outeide its domain. A most
striking and urgent instance of the kind is given in the powerful
and definite relational feeling, which hinds the organism to its
restitutive material. This evidently is of entodermic origin, and
its realisation or gratification is essentially an entodermic pro-
cess. The kinship with this peculiar outside existent, •which
actually gives significance to the sign coming from the sensitive
surface, lies unmistakeably in the pre-established molecular
constitution of the two related existences, the organism and its
food. It does not rest in the perceptual effect of the food
through the sensory inlets of the organism.
It is each time the deeply rooted play of our own nature that
is set going by the definite but superficial influences of other
existences. And however much this internal play may be
significant, either of actually occurring inner affections within
other existences, or merely of outer potentialities of the same;
the matter-of-fact coincidence of what we ourselves experience,
with what is actually contained in the thing observed, is exclu-
sively due to pre-established similarity or correspondence of
constitution in the realising subject and the foreign existence
influencing it.
You who Are now appearing within my field of vision are my
percept, exteriorised by an automatic reference to the compelling
powers that in reality constitute your existence. I understand
the significance of your smile solely by dint of the congruity
obtaining between my being and yours; a congruity brought
about by connaturalness of evolution.
The sight of this flame suggests its heat, t.e., its influence on
my organ of sight awakens, along with visual perceptions, also
the idea of heat connected with it I am then further capable
of realising as matter-of-fact this ideally suggested heat, so that
it shall become an actual sensorial affection. But this is accom-
plished solely by dint of a pre-established correspondence
between my own nature and the nature of that which consti-
tutes a flame as a thing-in-itself.
The links binding the ideas, suggestively awakened by actual
sensorial signs to the hidden potential virtues inhering in foreign
existences, have been organically elaborated. They rest as
acquired constitutional or structural properties in the realising
subject
The justification of this interpretation, given by the Philo-
sophy of Organisation, must be found, first, in the organic facts
actually obtaining, and then in its efficiency to explain the con-
figurations and processes of nature as a whole. It is my
endeavour to prove that the same entity which appears to us as
a human organism experiences also, as an affection of its own,
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the mental presence. It would almost seem as if to unsophisti-
cated minds this proposition must appear well-nigh self-evident
Yet what a drift of revolutionary consequences is' involved
in its admission. To become competent to judge of such a
position, philosophers must not shrink from the task of mas-
tering the general facts of organisation. It might readily be
shown that transcendental and experiential philosophies have
always been, in truth, little else than a more or less correct con-
ceptual or perceptual rendering of organic occurrences. But
these occurrences were recognised only in their immediate
mental effects within the region of highest organic elaboration;
and thus was overlooked the entire combination of causes co-
operating in the production of this highest organic region, and
therewith also of its immediate effect, the mental presence.
In consideration of this import of organisation we will not
refrain from casting an evolutional glance at the relation of the
organism to its environment
Though the influences of the environment induce all develop-
mental changes in the living substance, yet they bring about the
progressive elaboration in a very indirect way. Their immediate
operation is merely to shatter in specific fashion the chemically
cumulating surface of the organism. Nevertheless, it is through
this functional clash of the organism and its surroundings that tie
vital knot with all its wondrous perplexities is tied. As regards
the foreign powers, which are inferred as emitting the influences,
it is rightly conjectured that their exertions in relation to the
organism are purely dynamical. They act by mechanical im-
pact, by definite dynamical beats on the surface of the living
substance, disintegrating the same. In consequence, the living
substance restitutes itself by force of its own intrinsic affinities,
appropriating the necessary complemental material But it does
more than this. The many incident forces impinging on its
surface succeed in effecting a slight resultant change in the
entire combination of the chemical radical, which remains after
functional disintegration. The living substance, after a second
functional disturbance, is not exactly identical with the same
living substance after its first functional disturbance. The dis-
integrating forces effect a more and more unitary rearrangement:
less complete chemical disruption, more chemical commotion
and readjustment. In consequence, the following saturation or
restitution accomplishes the production of a higher chemical unit,
of a living substance more highly elaborated.
This structural development evinces itself, on the one hand,
in a greater degree of resistance to the disintegrating influences
by means of more rapid restitution; on the other hand, in a
more unitary co-operation of all the vital processes occurring
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within the living substance. It is always an internal com-
motion of the living substance that is effected by the foreign
influences. But this internal commotion is incited by means of
specific disintegration. The specific disintegration caused by
the foreign powers is followed by a specific reintegration due to
the intrinsic constitution of the living substance itself.
The lower the living substance in the scale of evolution the
more thoroughly do the disintegrating powers overthrow its
constitutional or chemical equilibrium. The lowest organisms
cannot even attain a stable or equilibrated surface. When at a
higher stage of development the living substance is becoming so
far elaborated as to maintain against the impinging forces the
stability of its surface through prompt repair, then the internal
commotion caused by the surface-disturbance is also becoming
more and more regulated. At last, the surface-disturbances are
found specifically attuned to the special kinds of disintegrating
influences. The chemical surface-vibrations of the living sub-
stance are now synchronous with the dynamical medium-vibra-
tions, and constitute therefore adequate signs or responses,
followed by no more internal commotion than their restricted
range of activity directly compels. Through more and more
definite restriction and developmental specification of the
general commotion of the living substance, the perceptual world
is gradually wrought with growing distinctness within its sen-
sorial susceptibility. The general sensitiveness of the vital unit
becomes thus significantly determinate through the organisation
of a system of specific and localised sensory relations, which
sensory relations on stimulation furnish to the mental presence
sensonal signs denoting the existence of specific external powers.
In the highest organisms the entire surface is found variously
and delicately attuned by means of specialised relational
elements to the influencing powers all around.
The sensorial sign denotes the external existence, because it
has been gradually elaborated by the action of that specific
foreign influence up to the point of synchronous restitution,
whereby in adequate response it resists the disintegrating beats.
The sensory resistance, or counterbalancing of disintegration
through restitution, gives to the compulsion the character of a
specific and fixed functional commotion. It contains also the
germ or " impression " of our idea of power so vainly sought for
by Hume, and, in my opinion, so wrongly placed by many
philosophers and scientists in a feeling believed to accom-
pany the innervation of voluntary muscles. The compelling
power is felt only because it is resisted, and it is felt not only in
consequence of resistance experienced by muscles, but also in
consequence of resistance exerted by sensory organs.
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The principal truth, however, which I am endeavouring to
render quite clear is, that during the evolutional process there is
no putting-together of pre-existing elements of any kind, neither
of a mere sensory nor of a reflex nature. Whatever appears
separate and elemental in the organic individual, and here more
especially in its ectoderm, has been gradually specialised within a
single living unit; has been rendered heterogeneous and concrete
by the establishment of more and more specialised organic rela-
tions to specific outside influences. All these multitudinous rela-
tions are cosmical riches accruing to the one indivisible individual,
complicating its organisation and contributing to the resources of
its mental microcosm. Thus, at the sensory surface, the objec-
tive world makes its symbolical entry into the living substance.
With specialised sensorial affections it builds up its objectified
appearances, supplying the organic individual with all its wealth
01 knowledge. It is centripetally that our unitary being receives
its discriminable and specialised affections, and on its system of
organised surface-relations is dependent the development of its
entire nature down to its innermost core. Through organic,
elaboration, starting at its points of contact with other exis-
tences, the living substance is gradually impregnated with
meaning, with definite references to surrounding powers, and its
consonant constitution reveals at the remotest suggestion a wide
and varied expanse of such organised relations. These relations,
now firmly and definitely pre-established, have been all centri-
petally wrought by slow degrees of specific elaboration, have
with progressive subtlety and distinctiveness been welded into
the unitary structure of the living substance by the persistent
operation of specific outside influences.
I dwell thus emphatically and repeatedly on the structural
elaboration of the living substance through peripheral influences,
because once adequately recognised it renders certain the direc-
tion of the creative influx, and rescues us from the tyranny of
sterile doctrines. Take, for instance, even Critical Idealism,
whose aim it is to be a conciliatory form of Transcendentalism,
keeping resolutely in view the import of the sense-derived
material of thought It is clear that under its assumption of a
pure, intelligible Ego, irradiating all synthetical powers, progress
of any kind—if at all attainable—can make its way into our
world only through the same entry as the energy, on whose
activity the entire value of experience is made to depend. We
should then have to look for any accession to our mental
capacities, not to the fructifying intercourse with the sensible
world, but to the transcendent source that sustains the intelli-
gible Ego, through whose energising influence our mind is sup-
posed to derive all its phenomenal efficiency. If I am a priori
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in possession of certain powers, which transfigure a meaningless
medley of material into a full-fashioned universe; if it is I who
impose shape and order upon nature, accomplishing this by dint
of spontaneous faculties supernaturally derived; then it is
certain I have to look for guidance in life only to inward inspi-
ration.
This being undeniably so, can any serious thinker believe that
it will make no difference in the fate of humanity, whether its
leading minds are directed by the one or the other, by the cen-
trifugal or the centripetal attitude towards the life-giving
source ? It is, therefore, above all incumbent on us to seek a
firm basis for a sound theory of practice, for the systematic
organisation of progress.
Exulting in the harmonised and unified wealth of our ideal
world, we have nevertheless to recognise that it is an ex-
periential and not a transcendental gift; not a gift accruing
directly to mind as such, but accruing to it indirectly through
organising influences.
It will very likely be pertinently remarked that the view
here taken is itself transcendental and dogmatic in the highest
degree. We have conceded that nothing but mental states are
really given, and, notwithstanding, a whole universe of external
powers is not only hypothetically conjectured, but its existence
confidently postulated, and pressed into active service as the
efficient source of the very mental states, from which it was
a mere inference. This, certainly, seems to be not only a vicious
circle, but one whose larger half is moreover formed by a pure
fiction. It is well worth while earnestly to ponder over these
specious objections, for they take us to the very heart of the
question. I have sufficiently shown that what we really under-
stand by a mental state is to be found only within the mental
presence. The mental presence alone is actual mind. All the
rest is merely potential mind. This is a fact so obvious that
when once realised it can nevermore be overlooked. It neces-
sarily involves transcendentalism and dogmatism in all philo-
sophy. For the task is to explain the nature of the vast
system of hidden potentialities, the partial and actual manifesta-
tion of which, at the time being, constitutes the mental presence.
Where then are all the multifarious possessions of mind not just
now consciously present ? This is a supreme question, the
answer to which cannot in any way be evaded. Let philosophers
candidly ask themselves : Is it fairly answered by conceptually
amplifying the mental presence so as to make it contain a full
assortment of mere abstract signs for all mental potentialities ?
This, however, is exactly the account that is rendered by so
many thinkers of the stupendous confluence of transcendent
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powers that upholds our universe. Some, indeed, try to imagine
a mental presence containing within its one conscious moment
the actuality of all our mental potentialities. But this is
to postulate an altogether inconceivable and incongruous entity.
For our mental nature forms an enduring unit only by dint
of its potential implieations. Start going its potentialities,
and in dense crowds the perishing manifold will hurry by; keep
on with sufficient incitement, and in wild delirium the whole
unitary system will dissolve into a dizzy maze of crumbling
thoughts and flitting phantoms.
All the explanations of mental potentialities keeping ex-
clusively within the sphere of mind, and resting on the desire to
assimilate the hidden powers with that which appears to us
most exalted, are clearly subjective fictions, having nothing
outside to sustain them. The Philosophy of Organisation, on
the contrary, wishing for the present to account for nothing
more exalted than just our own mental potentialities, offers as
explanation of them an infinitely more verifiable background of
power. It does not fancifully construct an inconceivable state
of existence endowing it ad libitum ; but shows how that, which
with minute distinctness is in all verity perceptually revealed to
us, must, by dint of its disclosed properties, be itself the unitary
being, incorporating all the wealth of potential mind. Truth
has to be unswervingly followed, wherever it may lead. Surely
its guidance alone can take our thought to the fountain head,
whence our being mysteriously flows; to the depth of power,
from which it primordially arose, and on which it now trustingly
reposes, from moment to moment transcendentally sustained. In
this sense the Philosophy of Organisation is uncompromisingly
transcendental. Kant called his system Transcendental Ideal-
ism, placing the powers and their efficient operations within the
mental sphere. He gave in contradistinction the name of Trans-
cendental Realism to that philosophical system which hypos-
tatises things-in-themselves as efficient causes of things in
perceptioa The view of reality here explained may be likewise
called Transcendental Realism; but with the understanding that
under the causative things-in-themselves are to be reckoned
nothing actually mental, but only all inferred powers, as far as
they are capable of affecting the organic individual, together with
all such inferred powers as constitute the organism itself
The whole question here involved lies really in a nutshell.
Kant, having chiefly the mental states as such in view, ne-
glected the entire neural organisation lying between the skin
and those parta of the central nerve-substance, which furnish to
the mental presence the conceptual order. He offers to the
outside powers impressible sensibility and also pure inactive
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time and space, in which somehow the sense-material falls into
perceptual order, so as to form appearances. Then he seta in
motion his only sphere of activity, the conceptual powers, by
which the passive raw-material of perception is conceptually as-
similated. Instead of tracing the vital activity unifying and
transforming sense-material along the entire neural organisa-
tion from periphery to centre, he reaches out from the most
exalted region of the mental presence itself, and attempts at
once to snatch up into it the crude products of sensory function.
We, on the contrary, do not lose sight of the organisation
under the skin. Granting likewise1 that we receive sensory
impulses from outside, we endeavour organically to account for
the. marvellously varied and systematised synthesis of sense-
material found accomplished within the mental presence.
The chief difficulties in the way of a common understanding
are, it would seem, first the evident but mysterious subsistence
somewhere of all mental potentiality as a unitary system, and
secondly the unmistakeable but unexplained spontaneity, iden-
tity, and ideal self-sufficiency of the centrifugal current of per-
sonality.
The Philosophy of Organisation answers, as we have seen, the
1
 To silence those who wish to make it appear that Kant reached the
sphere of things-in-themselves only within mind by means of mental
synthesis, complementing all mental implication by the so-called Ideas of
pure reason, I will (juote two passages.
Eberhard had maintained : " We may choose as we please, we arrive at
things-in-themselves." Kant replies: " This exactly is the constant
burden of the Critique." " It says the things, as things-in-themselves, give
the material to empirical intuitions (they contain the ground that deter-
mines the perceptual faculty according to its sensibility), but they are not
themselves the material of the same." Werke, VoL L, p. 436, Ed. Rosenk.
" Is it possible to believe that Leibnitz understood under pre-established
harmony the coinciding of two beings totally independent of each other in
their nature, and not to be brought into communion with each other
through their own powers t That would be enunciating Idealism indeed ;
for why should one at all assume bodies, if it is possible to view every-
thing that occurs in the soul as effect of its own powers, which it would
exert just the same when perfectly isolated ? Soul, and the entirely
unknown substratum of appearances, which we call bodies, are quite
different beings ; but the appearances themselves as mere forms of intuition
dependent on the nature of the subject's soul are only perceptions. And
thus the communion between intellect and sense in the same subject,
according to laws a priori, becomes intelligible, whilst at the same time the
necessary natural dependence of these laws on external things has not to be
sacrified to Idealism." VoL L, p. 480.
These unmistakeable sentences were written seven years after the Prole-
gomena, and nine years after the first edition of the OrUique.
A centripetal determination is here most distinctly admitted, curtailing
very essentially anything like efficient causntion within the sphere of sub-
jective ideality.
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first of these problems in a general way by recognising as
potential mind that -which perceptually appears to us as the
nervous system of an organism. It answers it more exhaus-
tively by showing how the nervous structure can form a poten-
tial system, of which the mental presence is the actuality.
Not to feel shocked, a3 we are so apt to be, at the apparent
tangibility and familiarity of that which we declare to be the
seat and substratum of mind, we have to remember how very
remotely and figuratively we, in truth, become aware of it. The
entity that constitutes an observed personality merely incites in
specific ways—mostly through the help of foreign media—
the observer's sensibility, whereupon a pre-organised system of
efficiencies produces a definite appearance within his mental
presence. The observed personality when, for instance, visually
perceived, contributes to this phenomenal revelation nothing
but an inferred complex of awakening beats, indirectly con-
veyed to the observer's sensitive surface by the so-called cosmic
ether. Thus the nervous system, as the seat of potential mind,
is but a figuration framed in a foreign mind; framed there
autonomously through the agency of a foreign organisation,
incited by a foreign medium. It is into this far-off depth of
hidden being that recedes the veritable complex of energies,
which we so confidently call a nervous system. Nevertheless
we trust, and securely trust the perceptual revelation as a sym-
bolical representation most reliable to count upon. Surely
what is here so distinctly disclosed to us will give us no decep-
tive hints regarding the true nature of potential mind.
"With regard to the compounding of mental constituents, it
has been the custom hitherto to explain it, organically, by
assuming a mere synergistic chiming of relational elements. A
definite set of such elements—nerve-fibres and nerve-cells—
functionally incited were believed to produce, by a momentary
combination of their so actuated energies, all complex mental
states which we experience. In MIND XVIL, I have at length
shown how utterly impossible it is that a number of elemen-
tary beings should concentually, by the blending of their
various internal commotions, produce any kind of joint or
compound effect Nervous structure can transmit a sensorial
effect only through reproduction of the effect within its own
substance. A functional beat at the end of a nerve-fibre has the
same sensorial value as the initial beat, only because the
functioning substance at both places happens to be identical.
If a number of diversely functioning nerve-fibres are found to
converge centrally towards a common focus, where they termi-
nate as separate elements, then a compound effect of their
elementary energies can only be realised through an inherent
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efficiency of the central substance, which they conjointly incite.
The compound effect is the response of a synthetic substance,
which has become attuned to the complex stimulation; and this
response follows solely by dint of the powers inherent in that
substance. The central substance, in which all sensory elements
terminate, and in which all so-called motor elements originate, ia
indeed a veritable synthetic substratum with cumulative stages
of comprising and representative value. It constitutes sen-
sorially the more and more unified and epitomised effect of all
incoming relational elements. So much is this the case that
even the higher seated sensory organs are already in themselves
structures unifying and epitomising the effects of lower sensory
organs. An example of this, strikingly obvious, is given in the
relation of sight to touch. For sight may be interpreted as
virtual touch; touch sublimated into a widely comprehensive
and subtly suggestive system of intellectualised tactile represen-
tations.
Thus the entire organic elaboration of the individual culmi-
nates in the production of its mental presence, in which the
whole complex of aroused affections is found condensed into one
moment of conscious realisation. In this way, peripherally
incited signs, for instance, have compelling power first to rein-
state through stimulative irradiation their perceptual comple-
ment, and then to reinstate also though less coercively through
central representation and re-representation all their many
ideally suggested responses.
Of course it is only in merest outline that we can, at
present, infer what actually happens during the process of sen-
sorial concentration, which gives rise to the peripheral influx
into the mental presence. The special central arrangements are
too little known as yet But it would seem as if the time were
not far distant when we shall be able accurately to fill in this
general outline. Meanwhile we can with great certainty con-
clude as much as is here indicated. For it is obvious that all
neural arrangements go to form the microcosmic focus, which we
have called the mental presence. All collocations and properties
of the nervous tissue are therefore to be viewed as the poten-
tiality of the ever-resuscitated moment of conscious realisation.
One still more recondite central problem remains to be
examined. What constitutes the spontaneous, identical, self-
sufficient current of personality 1
We are irrefragably aware that our mental states are not
all compelled by energies foreign to ourselves; that from the
depths of our innermost being there goes out a fulness of power
to meet, the inrushing throng of impressions, and to dispose of
them according to ways of our own; that it is ourselves who
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possess the key to the order of the phenomenal roiiverse, refer-
ring each casual occurrence to its proper place in the vast and
unitary system of things found registered in the records of our
memory, nay, found imperishably ingrained in the intricacies of
the vital structure, where through endless toil it has become
securely and livingly organised.
Indeed, compared with the accumulated result of experience,
of which our entire frame with all its vitality constitutes the
condensed expression, the sundry happenings of individual life
are like random whiffs of wind sounding the chords of a mighty
instrument, which with its own massive swell is ever reverbe-
rating the grand harmonised sense of ever-speeding nature.
This universal sense constitutes super-individual Truth through
the common inheritance of generical acquisitions, and is rendered
more and more available and definite through special syntheti-
cal representations within the central substance and thereby
within the mental presence. It is this capitalised unity of
import that we discriminatively and testingly oppose to the
particular incitements of daily life, that we moreover construc-
tively impose on the raw material of nature. It is this or-
ganised and organising fund of cumulative power that
" Sweeps through the dull, dense world, compelling there
All new successions to the forms they wear,
Torturing th' unwilling dross that checks its flight
To its own likeness, as each mass may bear;
And bursting in ita beauty and its might
From trees and beasts and men into the Heavens' light"
In various ways I have laboured to show that the fundamen-
tal occurrence and culminating point of life is not its functional
manifestation; that, for instance, contraction is not the funda-
mental occurrence and culminating point of muscular vitality,
but rather a retrograde event1 It is by dint of intrinsic and
spontaneous energies that muscular substance expands, gather-
ing thereby through chemical cumulation the force which it
afterwards expends in contraction. Here, where we can visibly
follow the entire process, we gain an unmistakeable insight into
the centrifugal or creative current It is this same intrinsically
propelled current, which on every occasion maintains the iden-
tity of the living substance, restituting it after functional disin-
tegration, and repairing its integrity after deeper mutilations.
It is this regenerative current also that effects the developmental
growth of the organism that brings with it all the accumulated
and unified wealth of our being, preserving it intact against the
shattering influences of the outside world. It is this self-
1
 See a paper by the present writer in Pfluger's Arehiv XXV., " Zur
Lehre von der Muskelcontraction."
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evolving current of life, which is persistingly upholding our
being. In its unflagging perseverance our personality, with all
its spontaneous activities, safely abides.
It must be remembered that nerve-substance is really only a
very much higher elaboration of contractile substance. Its
response to impinging forces has become an adequately attuned
resistance. This is no longer the manifest yielding, with which
contractile substance answers to stimulation. But, essentially,
the process remains nevertheless the same. The foreign in-
fluences shatter the living substance, causing a more or less
profound chemical rupture. A small, split-off fragment goes
to form the excretions of the body. The main remaining portion
of the living structure contracts if it is muscular substance.
Here the contraction is the salient, and, as far as we know, the
only organically efficient function. This contraction is seen
by an observer as a more or less extensive mass-motion of
the functioning substance. But besides this mass-motion, and
corresponding to what is perceived as molecular commotion, the
muscle may possibly experience in itself some dim feeling of its
activity, may propagate towards the central substance elements
of consciousness. At all events, it is that which is perceptually
realised by an observer as mere molecular commotion that con-
stitutes in nerve-substance the only organically efficient function.
According to many positive indications this perceivable mole-
cular or chemical stir of nerve-substance is accompanied by a
peculiar inward experience, realised by the functioning sub-
stance itself. This experience we call feeling.
A feeling is an exclusively subjective incident, qualitatively
incommensurable with anything inferred in the outside powers,
which we assume as ite excitants, or as its substratum. It is
wholly the product of organic elaboration and activity, whatever
this may be in itself. The world figured in feeling is therefore
an organic creation. The initial sensorial responses, as well as
their synthetical values realised in the central substance, are
altogether incalculable revelations, manifesting a unitary life-
world marvellously self-efficient with regard to the environing
powers, but wholly dependent on organic structure.
In order then to form some idea in what manner the mental
presence is the product of nerve-structure, we have, above all,
to realise that mind is its natural and vital affection, that it is
the functional actuality of its potential energies. The activity
of what we perceive as nerve-centres forms the mental presence.
We perceive the mind-emitting substratum and its activity as
nerve-substance in molecular commotion, because it possesses
also the power of thus specifically stimulating an observer,
who however remains thereby totally unparticipant of the
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mental presence displayed simultaneously within the observed
subject
Having now as observers allowed both the organic individual
and its affecting surroundings to record their mutual relations *
on our impartial sensibility, we are in a position to judge which
part is played by each of them in the production of the final
effect, the mental presence. But it was solely by interpretation
of this final effect, i.e., the observer's own mental presence, that
the characteristics of all powers and their activities, i.e., of all
causes and their effectuations, had to be construed. We can,
therefore, readily conceive what an excessively involved problem
Causation really is. Indeed we need only study the very diverse
opinions held by the foremost thinkers of all historical times to
become aware what a Gordian knot Causation has ever proved
to philosophy.
Influences external to the organism act only as stimuli upon
the same, bringing into play through peripheral excitement a
pre-arranged system of deep-seated relations. This awakening
process furnishes to the organic individual the centripetal con-
tents of his mental presence, from which are inferred all external
existences and activities.
The symbolical figurations of this system of organically sig-
nalised occurrences may, however, prove deceptive as regards
their extrinsic bearings, chiefly because all sensorial affections
may also be more or less vividly awakened through stimulation
taking place inside the organism. We are beset not only by a
world of externally compelled suggestions, but also by a world
of suggestions of exactly the same import internally originating.
In both cases the stimulated affections are more or less
assimilated or neglected by the centrifugal activities, i.e., by the
spontaneous current which embodies the integrating power and
steadfast core of our being.
EDMUND MONTGOMERY.
(To be continued.)
1
 Not to complicate the present difficult discussion more than necessary,
I have here purposely left out of sight the effects produced by the living
individual on ita surroundings. Of these it will be time to treat, when on
some future occasion I shall nave to consider " Final Causation " from an
organic standpoint.
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